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A man who is assaulted under such circumstances as to authorize a reasonable
belief that the assault is made with a design to take his life, or inflict extreme
bodily injury, will be justified, in both the civil and criminal law, if he kill or
attempt to kill hiasassailant.
The question whether the belief was reasonable or not must be passed upon
by a jury, but a person does not act in such a case at the peril of making that
guilt, if appearances prove false, which would be innocence if they proved true.
It is well settled that a man is not liable in an action of trespass on the case,
for an unintentional conseqnential injury resulting from a lawful act, where
neither negligence nor folly can be imputed to him; and there is no reason for
a different rule where the injury is immediate and direct, and the action trespass.
Where a person in lawful self-defence fires a pistol at an assailant,.and missing
him wounds an innocent bystander, he ii not liable for the injury if guilty of no
negligence..
While this is the result of the application of well-settled legal principles, it is
questionable whether, in view of the too general practice of carrying firearms,
and the danger to innocent persons from their use, there should not be some
legislation changing the rule of law in such a case, or otherwise protectina the
public.
It is not the proper course for a judge to lay down the general principles
applicable to a case and leave the jury to apply them, but it is his duty to inform
the jury what the law is as applicable to the facts of the case.
The facts of a case are to be found by the jury, unless admitted, ana the judge
can only regard them as claimed, for the purpose of applying the law to them
contingently, if found; and he cannot properly refuse to charge upon the facts
claimed on the ground that in his opinion they are not proved.

Trespass for an assault.
a new trial.

Yerdict for plaintiff, and motion for

Kellogg, for the motion.
E. B. Munson and.Doolittle, contra.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BUTLER, J.-Upon a careful examination of the important
questions presented upon this record, I do not see how the omission of the court to charge as requested on the first point, or
the charge actually given on the second, can be vindicated, and
the verdict sustained.
1. It appears from the evidence offered on the trial that the
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defendant wounded the plaintiff in two places by two shots fired
from a pistol; and from the nature of the weapon, and the other
conceded circumstances, the jury were authorized to find, and
doubtless did find, that the wounds were inflicted with a design to
take the life of the plaintiff. It was incumbent on the defendant
to justify or excuse their infliction. He in the first place attempted
to justify them, and the obvious attempt to take life which aggravated them, by offering evidence to prove that he was assailed by
the plaintiff and others in a manner which indicated a design to
take his life, and " that he was in great bodily peril'and in danger
of losing his life by means of the attack," and that he fired the
pistol "cto protect his life and his body from extreme bodily injury."
If these facts were proved and found true, they fully justified
the attempt of the defendant to take the life of the plaintiff as
matter of law, and entitled the defendant to a verdict in his favor.
And so the court were bound to tell the jury, if properly
requested to do so by the defendant.
The motion further shows that the defendant did in, substance
request the court to charge, that if they found the fact proved
as claimed, he would be justified in self-defence in using the pistol
as he did-that the rule of law is " that a man may lawfully take
the life of -another who is unlawfully assailing him, if in imminent peril of losing his life or suffering extreme bodily harm, &c."
What a man may lawfully do he may lawfully attempt to do, and
that request embodied in substance, and with sufficient distinctness, a well-settled specific rule of law, applicable alike in .criminal prosecutions and civil suits and to the facts of the case as
claimed.
The court did not conform to the request. The charge as
given informed the jury what " the great principle" of the law
of self-defence is, and correctly; but that was not all to which
the defendant was entitled. It is not for juries to apply " great
principles" to the particular state of facts claimed and found, and
thus make the law of the case. When the facts are admitted,
or proved and found, it is for the court to say what the law as
applicable to them is, and whether or not they furnish a defence
to the action, or a justification for the injury, if that be the issue.
And so where evidence is offered by either party to prove a certai state of facts, and the claim is made that they are proved,
and the court is requested to charge the jury what the law is as
applicable to them, and what verdict to render if they find them
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proved, the court must comply. This ik not only the common
law rule, but it is carefully and explicitly declared in this state
by statute, that "cit shall be the duty of the court to decide all
questions of law arising in the trial of a cause, and in committing
the cause to the jury to direct them to find accordingly." Rev.
Stat., tit. 1, § 144. Here the rule of law applicable to the facts
claimed is as well-settled and specific as any rule of law in the
books, and it was the duty of the court, to give it to the jury as
requested, and direct them if they found the facts as claimed to
find a verdict accordingly. And if it were otherwise, and a specific rule settled by authoritative adjudicatibns, in which the great
principle had been applied to a similar state of facts, did not
exist, it would still have been the duty of the court to apply the
principle to the facts, and to tell the jury whether or not they
furnished a justification in law to the defendant, for that, in the
language of the statute, was "a question of law arising in the
case."
The first request of the defendant which we are considering
involved the finding of two principal facts, viz., first, whether the
plaintiff was one of the assailants, and second, whether the
assault was made with a design to take the life of the defendant
or inflict upon him extreme bodily harm. But the jury might
find upon the evidence that the plaintiff was one of the assailants,
and fail to find the design to take life imputed to him. To meet
such a contingency the defendant added to his request, that the
court should charge the jury, ",that when from the nature of the
attack there is a reasonable ground to believe that there is a
design to destroy his life or commit any felony upon his person,
the killing of his assailant will be excusable homicide, though it
should afterwards appear that no felony was intended ;" but the
court did not so charge, because, as the motion states, the court
did not consider that the facts of the case required such instructions.
The facts of a case are to be found by the jury unless admitted,
and the court can only regard them as claimed, for the purpose
of applying the law to them contingently if found. When therefore the motion states that the court did not think the facts of
the case required the instruction claimed, as the material facts
were in dispute it must be intended that the court was of opinion
that there was not any such law as claimed, applicable'to the
.facts as claimed. But in that the court were mistaken. A man
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who is assailed, and under such circumstances as to authorize a
a reasonable belief that the assault is with design to take his life,
or do him extreme bodily injury which may result in death, will
be justified in the eye of the criminal law if he kill his assailant,
and in an action of trespass, if he unsuccessfully attempt to kill
him, and he surviving brings his action, for the killing would
have been lawful and of course the attempt lawful; and no man
is liable in a civil suit or criminal prosecution for an injury lawfully committed in self-defence upon an actual assailant. Doubtless the question whether the belief was reasonable or not, must,
in either proceeding, be ultimately passed *upon by a jury; and
the assailed judges at the time, upon the force of the circumstances, when he forms and acts upon his belief at the peril, that
a jury may think otherwise and hold him guilty. But in the
language of Judge BRoNsoIN, in the thoroughly considered case
of Shorter vs. The People, 2 Comstock 193, ,he will not act
at the peril of making that guilt, if appearances prove false,
which would be innocence if they proved true." And such is
the law as cited by Judge SwrmT (2 Swift Dig. 285), from Selfridge's case, and as held on a careful review of all the cases in
Shorter vs. The People, and in numerous other cases which may
be found cited there, and in Bishop on Criminal Law, vol. 2d,
page 561; and it is the law of the land. That part of the
request of the defendant used the term ,excusable," instead of
ccjustifiable," in respect to the homicide, and the latter term
would have been more accurate. But the import of the request
is not materially varied by that, and we can not intend that it
influenced the decision of the court.
2. The plaintiff, in answer to the defence made, denied that he
was an assailant, and claimed that he was a bystander merely,
and requested the court to charge the jury, in substance, that if
they -so found, he was entitled to recover, although they should
also find the defendant to have been lawfully defending himself
against his assailants, and the injury to the plaintiff accidental.
'That request of the plaintiff embodies the unqualified proposition that a man lawfully exercising the right of self-defence, is
liable to third persons for any and all unintentional, accidental
injurious consequences which may happen to them, and the court
so charged the jury. Although there are one or two old cases
and some dicta which seem to sustain it, that proposition is not
law.
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It is well settled in this court that a man is not liable, in an
action of trespass on the case, for any unintentional consequential
injury resulting from a lawful act, where neither negligence nor
folly can be imputed to him, and that the burden of proving the
negligence or folly, where the act is lawful, is upon the plaintiff.
.Burroughs vs. H'ousatonic B. B. Co. 15 Conn. 124. Is the
rule differant in trespass, where the injury is the immediate and
direct, though undesigned and accidental, result of a lawful act ?
In respect to this question there is some confusion in the books,
arising from two causes. First, the decided cases directly involving the point are few, but the question has been very frequently
adverted to by way of illustration or argument, in cases where
the point was whether case or trespass was the appropriate form
of action. Such, with a single exception, were all the cases
which the plaintiff has cited on his brief from our own or other
reports in which the dicta originated. In all that large class of
cases the dicta are thus thrown out obiter, and assume' the fact,
without determining it, that the party is liable in one or the other
form of action. (See on this subject the remarks of SHAW, C.
J., in Brown vs. Kendall, 6 Cushing 895.) And in the second,
place, accidents (cognizable in actions at law, and distinguished
from those peculiarly regarded in equitable proceedings) resulting from lawful acts, differ in character, and the distinctions and
the right use of terms to characterize them have not always been
sufficiently appreciated or regarded. A careful attention to those
distinctions and the authorities will, I think, enable us to determine the question in hand with entire satisfaction.
An accident is an event or occurrence which happens unexpectedly, from the uncontrollable operations of nature alone, and
without human agency, as when a house is stricken and burned
by lightning or blown down by tempest, or an event resulting
undesignedly and unexpectedly from human agency alone, or
from the joint operation of both ; and a classification which will
embrace all the cases of any authority may easily be made.
In the first class are all those which are inevitable, or absolutely unavoidable, because effected or influenced by the uncontrollable operations of nature ; in the second class those which
result from human agency alone, but were unavoidable under the
circumstances; and in the third class, those which were avoidable
because the act was not called for by any duty or necessity, and
the injury resulted from the want of that extraordinary care
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which the law reasonably requires of one doing such a lawful
act, or because the accident was the result of actual negligence
or- folly, and might with reasonable care adapted to the exigency
have been avoided. Thus, to illustrate, if A burn his own house
and thereby the house of B, he is liable to B for the injury;
but if the house of A is burned by lightning, and thereby the
house of B is burned, A is not liable; the accident belongs to
the first class and was strictly inevitable or absolutely nnavoidable. And if A should kindle a fire in a long unused flue in his
own house which has become cracked without his knowledge, and
the fire should communicate through the crack and burn his house,
and thereby the house of B, the accident would be unavoidable
under the circumstances, and belong to the second class. But
if A when he kindled the fire had reason to suspect that the flue
was cracked, and did not examine it, and so as guilty of negligence, or knew that it was cracked and might endanger his house
and that of B, and so was guilty of folly, he would be liable
although the -act of kindling the fire was a lawful one, and he did
not expect or intend that the fire should communicate.
And so, to apply these principles to this case ;-if the defenant had been in the act of firing the pistol at an assailant in lawful self-defence, and a flash of lightning had blinded him at the
instant and diverted his aim, or an earthquake had shaken him
and produced the same result, or if his aim was perfect but a
sudden violent puff of wind had diverted it or the ball after it
passed from the pistol, and in either case the'ball by reason of
the diversion had hit the plaintiff, the accident would have been
so effected in part by the uncontrollable and unexpected operations of nature as to be inevitable or absolutely unavoidable; and
there is no principle or authority which would authorize a recovery by the plaintiff.
And, in the second place, if while in the act of firing the
pistol lawfully at an assailant, the defendant was stricken, or the
pistol seized or stricken by another assailant, so that its aim was
unexpectedly and uncontrollably diverted towards the plaintiff;
or if while in the act of firing with a correct aim, the assailant
suddenly and unexpectedly stepped aside, and the ball passing
over the spot hit the plaintiff, who till then was invisible and his
presence unknown to the defendant ; or if the pistol was fired in
other respects with all the care which the exigencies of the case
required or the circumstances permitted, the accident was what
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has been correctly termed " unavoidable under the circumstances," and whether the defendant should in such ease be
holden liable or not is the question we have in hand. For, in
the third place, if the act of firing the pistol was not lawful or
was an act which the defendant was not required by any necessity or duty to perform, and was attended with possible danger
to-third persons which required of him more than ordinary circumspection and care, as if he had been firing at a mark merely;
or if the act though strictly lawful and necessary was done with
wantonness, negligence, or folly, then, although the wounding
was unintentional and accidental, it is conceded, and undoubtedly
true, that the defendant would be liable.
In this case-the rule of law claimed by the plaintiff, and given
by the court to the jury, authorized them to find a verdict for
the plaintiff if they found the accident to belong to the second
class, and to have been "unavoidable under the circumstances."
We have seen that if the injury had been consequential and the
form of action case, the defendant would not have been liable,
and the question returns, whether he can and should be holden
liable because the injury was direct and immediate and the form
of action is trespass. I think not, whether the decision of the
question be made upon principle or governed by authority.
If the question is to be settled upon principle it seems very
clear that the form of the action should not be regarded, for the
liability of the defendant must be determined by the nature of
the accident, whether avoidable or unavoidable under the circumstances, or inevitable, and not by the fact that the injury was
direct or consequential. The foundation of that liability in
every case of accident, where it is the result of human agency
uninfluenced by the operations of nature, and the act is lawful, is
really negligence. This is true of collisions between vessels on
the water, or horses or vehicles and persons upon the land, which
constitute the largest class of cases, for, as the accidents result
from steering or driving and are therefore direct injuries, trespass is the only remedy. So when a man in firing at a mark
unintentionally wounds another, the injury is direct and the form
of action is trespass, but the ground of liability is negligence in
doing an unnecessary and avoidable though lawful act, without
that extraordinary degree of care which-the law demands in such
circumstances, and which would have prevented the accident. As
therefore the foundation of the liability is the same in both cases,
VoL. XIII.-34
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irrespective and independent of the question whether the injury
was direct or consequential, there is no reason for any distinction in respect to the justification in the two actions.
And to that effect is the current of authority. In England
the dicta cited from Raymond were disregarded by a majority of
the court in Scott vs. Shepherd, although urged by BLACKSTONE,
J., who dissented, and the decision is in point for the defendant.
No case in point for the plaintiff is cited upon his brief. The
case of Tames vs. Campbell, 5 Car. & P. 872, is not so, for in
that case Campbell the defendant and another were fighting
unlawfully, and in breach of the peace, and while thus fighting
and attempting to hit his antagonist, Campbell hit the plaintiff
who was a bystander. But there the act was every way avoidable.
Mr. Hilliard, in his work on Torts, vol. 1, chap. 5, sec. 9, so
states the law, and cites the English case of Wakeman vs. Bobinson, 1 Bingham 213, and the case fully sustains him. The
action was trespass for driving against the horse of the plaintiff, and the rule of law recognised by the court as applicable
to the action is stated in the head-note thus:-If one does
an injury by unavoidable accident an action does not lie, aliter
if any blame attaches to him though he be innocent of any intention to injure." If there be any later case overruling that, it
has not been pointed out to us, or fallen under our observation.
As late as 1860, and in the tenth edition of Roscoe's Digest of
the Law of Evidence at Nisi -Prius,that case is cited as law.
In this country, though the cases are few, they are all, so far
as we are informed, with the defendant. In the case of Vincent
vs. Stinekour, 7 Verm. R. 62, which was an action of trespass
against the defendant for driving a horse and sulkey against
the plaintiff, the defendant claimed that the accident was unavoidable under the circumstances, for that his horse became
ungovernable and the injury could not be prevented by prudence
and care, and the Supreme Court in. an elaborate opinion held
that a defence. In Brown vs. Kendall, 6 Cushing 292, which
was an action of assault and battery, the defendant accidentally
hit the plaintiff, a bystander, while raising a stick to strike and
part two dogs which were fighting. This was the precise case put
for the purpose of illustration by some of the English judges, as
cited on the brief of the plaintiff's counsel. Yet the court in
Massachusetts, Chief Justice SHAW giving the opinion, held that
the defendant was not liable "cunless the act was done in the
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want of the evercise of due care, adapted to the exigency of the
case, and therefore such want of due care became part of the
plaintiff's case, and the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to
establish it." The same principles are recognised by the Supreme
Court of the state of New York, in the case of Bullock vs. Babcock, 3 Wend. 391, although they were not applied because that
was a case of avoidable accident, the injury having been inflicted
by an arrow while shooting at a mark without reasonable care.And it is sufficient to add that the case of Vincent vs. Stinehour
was cited by Judge WILLIAMS, in giving the opinion in Burroughs vs. Rousatonic B. B. Co., 15 Conn. 131, with evident
approbation, although, as the case did not call for it, the principle involved was not in terms adopted. But the broad proposition subsequently stated without qualification in respect to the
form of action, that "cwhere there is neither negligence nor folly
in doing a lawful act, the party cannot be chargeable with the
consequences," tends to show the inclination of his mind, and we
cannot doubt that if the case had required it, the rule as settled
in Vincent vs. &inehour would have been adopted by the court.
Such are the general rules of law applicable to accidental
injuries by which we must be governed in deciding the question
as raised on the motion. But we are not insensible to the fact
that the danger of accidental injury to third persons from the
use of fire-arms, even in lawful self-defence, is comparatively
very great, that the bearing of these arms is becoming needlessly general and their use in populous places and thoroughfares
quite too frequent, and that some further protection to the public
from injury by them seems necessary. That protection might be
afforded by us perhaps, if we should hold, 1st, the use of firearms, even in lawful self-defence, to be attended by so much contingent danger to innocent third persons that accidental injuries
by them should be deemed exceptional and wholly inexcusable as
matter of law, or inexcusable unless the defendant should show
that they were inevitable or absolutely unavoidable; or 2d, that
all such injuries should be deemed primd facie negligent, and
that it should be left to the jury to say whether in the particular
case the danger of injury to third persons was so slight and
improbable that the case was exceptional, and the defendant
wholly free from blame, either in having or using the instrument.
It is obvious, however, that if we should thus introduce an exception into the law to meet new contingencies we should be going
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beyond the exigencies of this case (there being other errors), and
encroaching upon the peculiar duties of the legislative branch of
the government ; and to that branch, with this statement of the
condition of the common law, and suggestion in respect to the
importance of a remedy, we must leave the matter.
We advise that a new trial be granted.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
This case may be regarded as important upon both points raised and
decided, although in regard to the first
question there is little ground of doubt.
I. The very necessity of the case, in
self-defence, presupposes that the party
must be permitted to act upon appearances, but if he acts rashly, or negligently, he is responsible for consequences, as well to the party whom he
mistook for an assailant, as to all others
accidentally damaged by reason of the
rash or negligent attack on his own
part. This is declared in Levett's Case,
cited in Cook's Case, Cro. Car. 687, 538,
where the master of the house, supposing his house attacked, in the nighttime, by burglars, rushed down stairs,
with his drawn rapier, and seeing the
glimpse of a servant girl of one of the
neighbors, whom one of his own servants had secreted in the buttery, and
mistaking her for a burglar, thrust her
through the body, b which she died
immediately, and was held guilty of no
crime. And the same was maintained
in an early case, where the gamekeeper
shot the owner of the preserve, mistaking him for a deer-stealer, and it was
held excusable homicide. The same
doctrine has always been maintained
in the English courts, and is the established rule in America: State vs. Scott,
4 Iredell (N. C.) 409; Stewart vs. The
State of Ohio, 1 'McCook 66; Oliver vs.
State of Alabama, 17 Alabama 587.
This rule of the common law is too
well estallished to admit of question.
In cases where life is concerned, there

is no doubt it should be held under
severe restraint, and especially where
firearms are resorted to. But we do
not perceive any safer rule than that
of the common law, that the party be
allowed to act, and to carry his action
to the extreme limit of taking life,
where he, upon just grounds, earnestly
believes his own life to be in peril, and
there is no way of escape open. to him.
And the rule will equally apply where
be is under the same apprehensions of
grievous bodily harm, for the law does
not require men to incur such peril of
life or limb, looking to the law for redress. In all such emergencies the primary laws of nature revive, as against
the outlaw; and one who puts himself
in the place, or presents himself in the
guise of an outlaw, or a murderer, or
burglar, must be content to be treated
according to his apparent character.
This is not a point, at the present day,
open to much discussion.
II. The other question decided in the
case might seem, at first view, more
doubtful. But we believe it will be
found, upon careful analysis, equally
free from doubt. The question here is
not, as in Leame vs. Bray, 3 East 593 f,
and that numerous class of cases, whe
ther the action shall be trespass, or
case; but whether any action will lie,
for an accidental injury, or damage,
resulting from a lawful act. For so
long as the act itself is not lawful,
there is no question the agent is legally
responsible, in some form, for all the
direct and natural consequences of his
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act. That was decided in the leading
case of Scott vs. Shepherd, 2 Black.
892. 1 Smith's Lead. Cas. 210. But the
question in the principal case before us
is, whether, if the act done in self-defence is done upon a justifiable excuse,
and in a prudent and careful manner,
the agent is responsible for any unforeseen and accidental consequence of the
act, whether direct or indirect.
It
would seem there could be but slight
doubt in regard to a proposition of this
kind.
It is not whether the use of firearms
is allowable in self-defence. That has
been settled, by common consent, ever
since their invention- It is much the
same question as their use in war.
Self-defence is war; private war; allowing the party to resume, as against
an outlaw, or one who comes in the
guise of an outlaw, the primitive rights
of a state of nature, the ante-social
state, and to repel force by force.
Neither is it the inquiry, whether
firearms may be used in self-defence in
the midst of a melee, or street-fight.
For the law does not require a man to
use one mode of self-defence on one
occision, and not upon others. He
has a right to use all the means which
"God and nature have put into his
hands." It is the primitive war of
natural forces; and he is not obliged
to mete them out with a scrupulous
regard to possible consequences to
others. Others must be content to
take their chance, as they do in regard
to other legal acts; or as they do in
regard to all accidental consequences,
where no one is in fault. If the law
of self-defence requires qualification,
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in consequence of the more destructive
character of the instruments of modern
warfare, it should be done by the legislature rather than by the courts.
This doctrine is very ably defendedby SuAw, C. J., in Brown vs. Kendall
6 Cush. 292; and by WILLIAIIS, C. J.,
in Vincent vs. Steinhour, 7 Vt. 62. It
is -well said by LAwtNcz, J., in Leame
VS. Bray, eupra, and, as applied to the
present question, by SHtAw, C. J., in
Brown vs. Kendall, autpra, that if the
agent is to be made responsible, he
must be so to the full extent; and if
death ensue it will be manslaughter. at
the least. The result of this will be,
that if, in self-defence, where one may
kill his assailant, he should accidentally
kill another, he would be liable to punishment for manslaughter. It is very
obvious no such consequence could flow
from a lawful act.
The late case of Hummach vs. White,
9 Jur. N. S. 796, has some bearing upon
the question before us. It was there
held that where one took a horse, purchased the day before, into a crowded
street to train him, and the horse becoming restive, rushed upon the sidewalk, or pavement, and killed a man,
rightfully there, there could be no
action, civil or criminal, maintained
against such rider or owner of the
animal, without distinct affirmative
proof of negligence on his part. The
mere happening of the injury or damage is not evidence to be submitted to
the jury. There must be some distinct
affirmative evidence of negligence, to
entitle the plaintiff to go to the jury.
I. F. R.
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The Provisional (ourt for Louisana.
UNITED STATES VS. AUGUSTUS REITER.
UNITED STATES VS. JOHN LOUIS.
At the time of the establishment of the Provisional Court for Louisiana, a considerable part of the territory of that state was held by the forces of the United
States, in armed belligerent occupation.
. In a country so held, the authority of the occupying force is
paramount, and
necessarily operates the exclusion of all other independent authority in it.
Government from some source is a necessity, and while the power to give and
administer government is exclusively with a party occupying a country, there
can be no doubt that the right and the duty are his to furnish a government and
supply that want.
The establishment of the Provisional Court for Louisiana, by the President, as
Commander-in-Chief of the forces of the United States, while they held the territory in which it was to exercise its functions, was an act warranted by the law
of nations.
So long as the authority of the United States shall continue, the right and the
duty of it as the party dominant there to afford to the country a government will
continue.
Said court has, from the time of its foundation to the present time, rightfully
exercised its functions in territory in which the government of the United States
has been by force of its arms sovereign, and will continue rightfully to exercise
them there, so long as its commission shall remain unrevoked and the power of
the United States shall continue to support it in the exercise of them.

The accused were tried before Judge Peabody and a jury, and
were severally convicted; Reiter of murder, and Louis of arson.
After the convictions a motion was made in each case in arrest
of judgment.
'Whittaker,for Reiter.
Durant - tBorne, for Louis.
Geo. D. Lamont, Prosecuting Attorney of the Court, for the
United States.
PEABODY, J.-These two cases may without inconvenience or
danger of confusion be considered together, although they have
in fact no connection with each other. The same objection to the
proceeding of the Court to pronounce sentence upon the accused
and in arrest of judgment, is made by both the defendants, and
although the objection is urged on different grounds in the two
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cases, still the objection is proper to be considered on all the
grounds in each case. It is urged that this court is not authorized to try these defendants, and that its proceedings have not
the sanction of law in the premises. If for any reason this be
the case, no further steps should be taken. If for any reason
the authority is wanting in one case it is equally so in the other,
and the court should refrain from going further in either case.
The accused have been indicted separately and tried separately
on charges wholly different and having no connection the one
with the other, and the consideration of their cases together
rather than separately, now, is a matter of'convenience solely.
One of the accused, Reiter, has been indicted for murder, in
causing the death of his wife by violence.
The other has been indicted for arson, in burning a building
used as a mansion or dwelling-house."
Each has been tried before a jury of this parish and been duly
convicted of the offence charged in the indictment, and each-is
now before the court on a motion in arrest of judgment, and in
each case the arrest is urged on the ground that the court is not
authorized in law and has not jurisdiction to try the case.
The counsel for Reiter claim that the court, in its constitution
and creation, had not originally the warrant of law to try the
accused.
The counsel for Louis concede that the court had authority
originally to entertain and try such a case, but insist that for
causes occurring since, its authority has ceased; that certain steps
taken in Louisiana toward the re-establishment of a civil state
government have superseded the powers once possessed by the
court, and that it is now without jurisdiction or power. The
offences of which the defendants stand convicted, by the laws of
Louisiana are punishable with death, and nothing would be more
agreeable to the court than to proceed with the utmost caution in
considering these objections to its jurisdiction.
The accused have been indicted, tried, and convicted under and
pursuant to the law of the state of Louisiana.
The first question to be considered is whether the court has
ever had, from the nature of its origin and constitution, authority to try cases like these ; and if this question shall be decided
in the affirmative it will remain to examine
The second question, namely, whether the power to try or the
jurisdiction over such a case, once possessed by this court, has
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been withdrawn or lost,-whether the court in fact has been i3
any way deprived of it by subsequent events. It must be conceded that the court, in its origin and structure;
is quite out of the usual course and novel. It has not its origin
or foundation in any constitutional or legislative enactment-is
not the creature of any regularly-organized constitutional or legislative body. Ordinarily the judicial tribunals of the land are the
cretions of the legislative departments either of the State or
Federal government, and for the regularity of their creation and
the character and extent of their powers depend on the action of
the legislative branch of the one or the other of these powers. In
such cases, the first thing to be done in ascertaining the legality
or powers of a court, is to consult the constitution and legislation
of the government from which it claims to hold commission, and
in the letter of these is found the act of its creation and the
extent and limit of its powers.
Not so with this Provisional Court, which depends for its existence on the law of nations, and on that part of the law of nations
relating to war-the law by which parties and neutrals are guided
in their treatment of each other in a state of war ; and that portion of it which relates to and determines the rights and duties
of a belligerent, a conqueror in the territory of an enemy and
holding it in armed occupation. On that law must depend the
decision of the question presented by this motion, of the validity
in law and the powers of this court.
On that law alone must this court rely for the power and juris-

diction it has exercised for a considerable time, in a large number
of cases involving amounts usually very large.
It was in that law that the President of the United States,
pressed by the urgent wants of the community here, found his

warrant for the establishment of this court in the midst of the
country of an enemy held by him jure belli in armed belligerent
occupation.
The authority of this court is derived from the President of the
United States, the Chief Executive of the nation and Commander-in-Chief of its forces military and naval.

It is conferred by

an order, of which the following is a copy:
EXECUTIVE ORDER, ESTABLISHING A rROVISIONAL COURT IN LOUISIANA.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

1

Washington, October 20, 1862.
The insurrection which has for some time prevailed in several of the
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States of this Union, including Louisiana, having temporarily subverted and
swept away the civil institutions of that state, including the judiciary and
the judicial authorities of the Union, so that it has become necessary to hold
the state in military occupation; and it being indispensably necessary that
there shall be some judicial tribunal existing there capable of administering
justice, I have, therefore, thought it proper to appoint, and I do hereby constitute a Provisional Court, which shall be a court of record for the state of
Louisiana, and I do hereby appoint Charles A. Peabody, of New York, to be
Provisional Judge to hold said court, with authority to hear, try, and determine all causes, civil and criminal, including causes in law, equity, revenue,
and admiralty, and particularly all such powers and jurisdiction as belong
to the District and Circuit Courts of the United States, conforming his proceedings, so far as possitle, to the course of proceedingy and practice whicli
has been customary in the courts of the United States and Louisiana, his
judgment to be final and conclusive. And I do hereby authorize and
empower the said judge to make and establish such rules and regulations as
may be necessary for the exercise of his jurisdiction, and to appoint aprosecuting attorney, marshal, and clerk of the said court, who shall perform the
functions of attorney, marshal, and clerk, according to such proceedings and
practice as before mentioned, and such rules and regulations as may be inAd
and established by said judge.
These appointments are to continue during the pleasure of the President,
not exceeding beyond the military occupation of the city of New Orleans, or
the restoration of the civil authority in that city and in the state of Iuisiana.
These officers shall be paid, out of the contingent fund of the War Department,
compensation as follows.
Such compensations to be certified by the Seqretary of War. A copy of this
order, certified by the Secretary of War, and delivered to such judge, shall
be deemed and held to be a sufficient commission. Let the seal of the
United States be hereunto affixed.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
By the President:
WILLIAM

H.

SEWARD,

Secretary of State.
WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, 23d October 1862.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy, duly examined and com.pared with the original of the Executive Order of the President of the United
States, constituting a Provisional Court for the stote of Louisiana.
Witness my hand and the seal of the War Department.
EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.
Attest: JOHN POTTS, Chief Clerk.

.This order, by its terms, ho doubt embraces cases like these
under consideration, as indeed it does, perhaps, all others which
can occur in life, or become the subject ;f judicial investigation.
The language of the order "to hear, try, and determine all
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causes, civil and criminal, including causes in law, equity, revenue,
and admiralty," is clear and unquestionable, and embraces this
class of cases, with all others of every description.
The president then sought to give power to this court to try
arld determine cases of this kind, and having made an order to
that effect, has given it that power, if he himself had authority
to confer it. The only question remaining to be answered on
this point, is whether the President had authority to confer such
powers and jurisdiction.
The authority of the President of the United States to create
this court, and invest it with powers which should embrace these
cases, depends, to some extent at least, on the Constitution of
the United States, which creates the office exercised by him, and
determines its functions. That Constitution, article 2, section 1,
paragraph 1, declares as follows:
"The executive power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America."
It also provides, article 2, section 2, paragraph 1:
"The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the army
and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several
States when called into the actual service of the United States."
As President, Chief Executive, and Commander-in-Chief of
the army and navy, he would not ordinarily have power to establish tribunals for the determination of questions civil and criminal, arising in civil life. Was there anything in the condition
of affairs existing at the time the order was made which could
give him the power to establish them, and if so, what was there
in the condition of affairs then existing to give him power in this
respect not ordinarily possessed by him as one of the attributes
of his office?
Between the Government of the United States and a people
inhabiting a portion of country lying on the Atlantic Ocean and
the Gulf of Mexico, and extending north beyond the northern
boundary of the territory in question, and embracing within its
borders that section of territory theretofore known, and still most
conveniently designated, as the State of Louisiana, a war had for
some time been waged. This fact is notorious, and moreover it
is conclusively settled by the President, the ultimate arbiter of the
fact, by his proclamation to that effect. As to its existence, therefore, as well as the existence of some other facts to which I shall
have occasion to tefer, equally well known, no time will be consumed in attempting to prove them, but they will be assumed.
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It is a matter of public knowledge and notoriety that this war
had been pending, and that the country over which the jurisdiction of this court is in question, and heretofore known, and in
the order establishing this court described as the State of Louisiana, had been for many months held and occupied by those people and their forces, military and naval. That it had been for a
long time previous to, and also since the commencement of this
war, inhabited, cultivated, and owned by tlh same people who had
entered into and carried on war with the Government of the
United States, and that it was still so inhabited by a people whose
relations with the Government of the United States had for some
time been and were still those of enmity. That it had, in the
course of the war, been by force of the arms of the United States
wrested from the enemy, and was at the time the order establishing this court was made, held by the forces of the United States
in armed belligerent occupation. That the armed belligerent
forces of this enemy of the United States had been, by force of
the arms of the United States, expelled from this country, and
that they were at the time held out of it by the armed forces of
the United States, and that war was still waged between those
belligerents.
The civil institutions of the country thus held, including the
tribunals for the administration of justice, had been formed and
established by the enemy of the conquering power, and were by
it administered at the time of the conquest.
These institutions having been formed, established, and administered by the Government existing previous to and at the time
of the conquest confessedly hostile to. the Government of the
United States, were the only institutions found there at the time
the military authority of the United States was by force of its
arms established there.
By the conquest of the country, in this case as in others, the
previo-Oly-existing government and the power by which it wis
administered were subverted and swept away, and those of the
conquering power were substituted in their places. This is the
necessary consequence of a conquest of a country-a transfer of
the control, government, and sovereignty of it from one party to
another.
The old power is conquered and extinguished, and the new one
of the conqueror is instituted in its place. The old institutions,
if not abandoned and extinguished, are at least suspended in
their action.
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They may be transferred to and adopted by the new governing
power and may be used and operated by it, just as an old
machine, detached from the power that has usually moved it, and
abandoned for use as a whole, may furnish isolated pieces of
machinery which can profitably be introduced into a new machine
having different qualities, moved by a new and wholly another
power, and used to accomplish on the whole, perhaps, purposes
quite different. However there may be retained in use by the
new governing power some of the features or institutions of the
government which has been supplanted, it is nevertheless wholly
another government, and derives its life and all its vital qualities
from a new source-the new sovereignty installed by the conquest.
"-Aconquest necessarily operates the extinguishment of the power
of the party conquered in the country which is the subject of
conquest, and the establishment there of the power of the conqueror. Without this there is no conquest of a country, and
there can be none.
When the power previously'dominant in a country has been
extinguished by that of another party, and rendered incapable of
governing it further, and a new one has been established in its
stead, it is both the right and the duty of the party thus coming
into power to see to it that a government wholesome and salutary
shall be established and administered, and, as in such a case there
is only one power, that of the new party succeeding, capable of
giving and administering the government, it follows that it is the
duty as well as the right of that power to do it.
No country can exist without a government of some kind.
The rights of the inhabit*ants must be protected-crime must be
restrained and punished-the virtuous must be protected against
the vicious-the weak against the strong-order must be preserved
'and security to person and estate assured. The party dominant
for the time being has the power to do it, and no one else has
the power, and it follows from the necessity of the case that he
must exercise it.
So the Government of the United States, having conquered
and expelled from the territory of -country, theretofore known as
the State of Louisiana, the power by which the government of it
had been theretofore administered, and having established there
its own power, was bound by the laws of war, as well as the die.
tates of humanity, to give to the territory thus bereft a government in the place and stead of the one deposed or overthrown,
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such an one as should reasonably secure the safety and welfare
of the people thus reduced to subjection; in some manner, not
inconsistent, to be sure, with the proper interests of the governing power, and the maintenance of it in its supremacy therp.
The power established there was the military power of the
United States, and the President of the United States, as we
have seen, the Commander-in-Chief of the forces, military i and
naval, of the United States, was at the head of that power, and
had the right and duty to exercise and direct it. It was incumbent on him, representing for this purpose the sovereignty of the
United States, to see that the duty devolving on his government
should be properly performed.
He acted in obedience to this duty, and in accordance with this
right, when he attempted to establish there a judicial tribunal
capable of deciding controversies and administering justice.
But how does this question stand on the authority of adjudged
cases ?
In the case of Cross et al. v. Rarrson, in the Supreme Court
of the United States, in 1853, reported in 16 Howard, at page
164, the Court held that a civil government formed in California,
under the direction of the President of the United States, is
Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy, shortly after the
conquest of the country, and while it was held in military occupation by the forces under him, was an act warranted by the laws
of nations, and that the formation of such a civil government
was the rightful exercise of a belligerent right over a conquer.ed
country.
It appeared that the port of San Francisco had been conquerod
by the arms of the United States in 1846, and that shortly aftqrwards, the United States holding military possession of all Upper
California, the President authorized the commander of the forces
of the United States there, to ex~rcise the belligerent rights of
a conqueror, and form a civil government for the conquered territory, with powers to impose duties on imports and tonnage, for
the support of the government and of the army which held the
country as a conquest in possession. This was done, and duties
were levied and collected for a time. Afterwards, a treaty of
-peace was made with Mexico, by which Upper California was
ceded to the United States'
After this treaty, and after the cession to the Unted States
.of the territory, the Military Viovernor continued to collect
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import and tonnage duties as he had done before, but at the rate
authorized by Acts of Congress in other parts of the United States;
and for that purpose appointed the defendant in this suit collector
there. He, as such collector, without any legislation of Congress on the subject, collected those duties to a large amount from i
the plaintiffs, who sought in that suit to recover them back again.
The question presented was, whether the United States, after
tAe ession of this territory to it, and in the absence of any legislation by Congress on the subject, had a right by its Military
Governor to collect those duties. The Governor, it appeared,
collected them of his own motion, and without any instructions
on the subject from his government at home. No question
of the right of the government to levy duties as it pleased, while
the country was held by right of conquest in strictly military
occupation, appears to have been made ; but the continuance of
that right after the. treaty of peace, and after the cession of the
country to the United States, seems to have been chiefl in question. The Court sutained the right in the broadest manner,
putting their decision on the ground that the formation of the
evil government when it was done, was the lawful exercise of a
belligerent right over conquered territory. That that government being in existence when the territory was ceded to the
United State; its- powers did not cease by reason of the cession
of the country to the United States, or of the restoration of
peace, and that it was rightfully continued after peace was made
with Mexico, until Congress should legislate otherwise.
The decision covered the *whole ground that the duties were
lawfully collected by the Civil Military Governor of California,
an instrument of the provisional government of the United States
in that country whilst the military occupation was continued;
and that it was so afterwards from the ratification of the treaty
of peace until the revenue syltem of the United States was put
in practice, under Acts of Congress passed for that purpose;
in effect deciding that the provisional government of the United
.States there wa rightful and legal, and that it-continued in force
sa legal rightful government through the time the country was
held in military occupation, and after that occupation ceased, and
that it was, in fact, in force until some other system was provided according to law to supersede it.
For the doctrine that a conqueror in a conquered country may
establish a governumt sad courts for the administration of justice,
the case of Leftexudorfireta. vs. WeM, decided by the Supreme
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Court of the United States, in 1857, reported in 20 Howard
176, is an authority directly in point. In that case the conduct of the Government of the United States by General Kearney,
the officer in command of its forces there, was brought in question. It appeared that after the conquest of that country by the
arms of the United States, General Kearney, in command'of the
forces there, established a government and provisional courts for
the administration of justice.
Those courts, in the case referred to, were adjudged to be legal,
and their decisions obligatory as warranted by law. The power
to establish the government and the courts was directly in question, and was directly passed upon by the court, and was sustained on the ground of the right of conquest.
In that case, moreover, it appeared that the country conquered
was subsequently, by treaty, ceded to the United States, and it
was claimed that by the act of cession the right of the United
States to govern the country and enforce the laws made by the
Provisional Government while it was held in military occupation,
was terminated.
It was not seriously questioned that the United States might,
jwhile it held the country in military occupation, establish and
administer a system of government-make laws by which to
govern the inhabitants and regulate their rights and intercourse
among themselves, and set up courts by which the laws so made
should be administered. That right was deemed to be too evident
to be seriously questioned. It was, however, in issue, and was
necessarily passed upon by the court. The doctrine chiefly contended for, was that by the cession of the country to the United
States, the right to govern it by that provisional system adopted
when it was held a conquest of arms, was terminated, and that
the United States had, after the cession, only the right to govern
it like other territory of the United States, by laws emanating
from Congress-the constitutional law-making power of its own
Government-enacted in reference to it as territory of the
United States.
This position was not sustained by the court, but was overruled and adjudged not warranted in law.
The court says : "Of the validity of these ordinances of that
Provisional Government there is made no question with respect
to the period during which the territory was held by the United
States as occupying conqueror, and it would seem to admit of no
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doubt, that during the period of their valid existence and operation, these ordinances must have displaced and superseded every
previous institution of the vanquished or deposed political power
which was incompatible with them. But it has been contended,
that whatever might have been the rights of the occupying conqueror, as such, these were all terminated by the termination of
the belligerent attitude of the parties, and that with the close of
the contest, every institution which had been overthrown or suspended would be revived and re-established.
"The fallacy of this pretension," the court proceed to say,
" is exposed by the fact, that the conquered territory never was
relinquished by the 'conqueror, nor restored to its original condition or allegiance, but was retained by the occupant until possession was matured into absolute, permanent dominion ahid sovereignty." The Court then proceed to decide when the institutions
of the provisional government would terminate.
They say: -We conclude, therefore, that the ordininces and
institutions of the provisional government could be revoked or
modified by the United States alone, either by direct legislation on
the part of Congress, or that of the territorial government, in the
exercise of powers delegated to it by Congress." The question
there presented was the validity of an ordinance of the territorial government, authorizing attachments of property of debtors,
enacted by the provisional government, while the country was
held in military occupation, and before the cession of it, but
sought to be enforced by the Provisional Territorial Court after
the cession of the country to the United States, and after the
military occupation had ceased. The Court upheld the la* in its
origin, and also in its continuance in force, and the administration of it by the Provisional Territorial Court after the cession
of the country, and after the military occupation had ceased.
In the case of Jecker vs. Montgomery, 14 Howard 498, decided in 1854, the same Supreme Court of the United States incicidentally recognise the legality and powers of those provisional
courts, and while deciding that, for reasons peculiar to cases of
prize, and not at all applicable to any others, they could not
legally act in cases of that class, the court admit their powers
and jurisdiction in other cases: making three decisions of the
court of last resort of the Government of the United States quite
in point. Either of these should be sufficient authority for such
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a principle, if indeed a principle so plainly proper and necessary,
can bo thought to need authority of precedent at all.
But at the risk of being tedious and doing work of supererogation, which charges I am persuaded might well be maintained
against me, I will add to th~se authorities already commented on,
still another one, which has a bearing quite material on this case
at more than one point. I mean the case of The United States
vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton 246. That case, as well as those already
cited, decides that by the conquest and military occupation by
one nation of a portion of the territory of another, the portion
so acquired passes from the operation of the laws and government
of the nation to which it had previously belonged, and comes
under the laws and government of the nation making th. c-nquest. It also decides that while such territory is held I il.conqueror, it is the right of the party so holding it to gov rn it.
and for that purpose to make laws by which to govern it. That
while a portion of territory is so held, the laws of the conqueror
holding are in force there, and the laws of the party from whom
it has been taken are in abeyance not only defacto but also de
jure; that while it is so held, the conqueror has de jure as well
as defacto all the rights of dominion and sovereignty over it, and.
may exercise them at his pleasure, and that the former sovereign,
overcome or expelled, has no right there, and his laws have no
effect there ; that acts done there with the authority of the conqueror are legal and proper, but those done in violation of his
laws, even though done in obedience to the laws of the sovereign
expelled, are not legal, but contrary to law. In short, that, by
conquest, the sovereignty and right to rule of the conqueror are
introduced and established, and the sovereignty and right of rule
in the party expelled are extinguished; and that the duty of allegiance in the people remaining there is transferred in like manner from the vanquished to the victorious party ; in fact, that by
such an act the change of the sovereignty and allegiance are
complete, and new rights and duties in both parties are created
accordingly. I think that all these conclusions certainly follow
from what is decided, if, indeed, they are not all actuaPy (ecided
there.
That case, like each of the others cited, was decided by the
Supreme Court of the United States-the court of highcst
human authority on that subject-and as the decision was against
the United States, and in favor of the authority of Great Britain,
VOL. XIII.-35
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its enemy in the war, and was made shortly after the occurrence
of the war out of which it grew; and while no department of this
government was inclined to magnify the rights of Great Britain
or disparage those of its own government, there can be no suspicion of bias in the mind of the court in favor of the conclusion
at which it arrived, and no doubt that the law seemed to the
court to warrant and demand such a decision.
That case grew out of the war of 1812, between the United
States and Great Britain. It appeared that in September 1814,
the British forces had taken the port of Castine, in the state of
Maine, and held it in military occupation; and that while it was
so held, foreign goods, by the laws of the United States subject
to duty, had been introduced into that port without paying duties
to the United States. At the close of the war the place was by
tr, ity restored to the United States, and after that was done the
government of the United States sought to recover from the persons so introducing goods there while in possession of the British,
the duties to which by the laws of the United States, they would
have been liable. The claim of the United States was that its
laws were properly in force there, although the place was at the
time held by the British forces in hostility to the United States,
and the laws, therefore, could not at the time be enforced there ;
and that a court of the United States (the power of that government there having since been restored) was bound so to decide.
But this illdfsion of the prosecuting officer there was dispelled by
the court in the most summary manner. Mr. Justice STORY, that
great luminary of the American bench, being the organ of the
court in delivering its opinion, said: -The single question is
whether goods imported into Castine during its occupation by the
enemy are liable to the duties imposed by the revenue laws upon
goods imported into the United States. *
*
* .We are all
of opinion that the claim for duties cannot be sustained. * * * *

The sovereignty of the United States over the territory was, of
course, suspended, and the laws of the United States could no
longer be rightfully enforced there, or be obligatory upon the
iahabitants who remained and submitted to the conquerors. By
the surrender the inhabitants passed under a temporary allegiance
of the Bnitish government, and were bound by such laws, and such
only, as it chose to recognise and impose. From the nature of
the case no other laws could be obligatory upon them. * * * * *

Castine was therefore, during this period, as far as respected
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our r6venue laws, to be deemed a foreign port, and goods imported into it by the inhabitants were subject to such duties only
as the British government chose to require. Such goods were in
no correct sense imported into the United -States." The court
then proceed to say, that the case is the same as if the port of
Castine had been foreign territory, ceded by treaty to the United
States, and the goods had been imported there previous to its cession. In this case they - say there would, be no pretence to say
that American duties could be demanded; and upon principtes
of public or municipal law, the cases are not distinguishable."
They add at the conclusion of the opinion: -The authorities
cited at the bar would, if there were any doubt, be decisive of the
question. But we think it too clear to require any aid from
authority." Does this case leave room for a doubt whether a
country held as this was in armed belligerent occupation, is to
be governed by him who holds it, and by him alone? Does it
not so decide in terms as plain as can be stated? It is asserted
by the Supreme Court of the United States with entire unanimity, the great and venerated MARSHALL presiding, and the erudite
and accomplished SToRY delivering the opinion of the court, that
such is the law, and it is s6 adjudged in this case. Nay, more :
it is even adjudged that no other laws. could be obligatory; that
such a country, so held, is for the' purpose of the application of
the law of its former government to be deemed foreign territory,
and that goods imported there (and by parity of reasoning other
acts done there) are in no correct sense done within the territory
of its former sovereign, the United States.
No part of the remarks of the court in this case is more fully
warranted or proper than the last, to the effect that the ease is
too clear to require aidfrom authority.
The right, therefore, of a conqueror in a conquered country to
ordain a system of government for it, and among other institutions to erect courts of justice, and maintain them in the discharge
of their proper functions, is as well established and free from
doubt when considered on authority, as it is in principle; and
about as well in each as any. proposition which could find among
men an advocate to question it, could in the nature of things be
expected to be.
But it may be said that this reasoning, if correct as to territory •
foreign to the conqueror, and as to which his rights and duties
are simply and solely those of a conqueror by force of arms, is
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mot applicable to the case in question, for this Louisiana is a part
of the territory of the United States, over which the powers and
duties of the President and the other departments of the Government were already fixed, and are dependent on the Constitution

and laws of the United States, and limited to the powers and
duties conferred by them; and that those laws do not give the
President the power to establish a court like this, and therefore
that he has not that power.
'It is quite certain that ordinarily he would have no such
power; and hence, instead of looking for it to the Constitution
and laws of the United States alone, I have looked elsewhere and
to other facts than his merely occupying the place of President
at the time. I have invoked also the fact that he was by virtue
of that office, as commander of the forces of the United States,
holding in armed belligerent occupation the country in which the
court was established, and in which its powers and authority are
now brought in question.
, Is this country, for the purpose of determining the powers and
duties of the commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the
United States, to be deemed domestic, or is it to be deemed
foreign territory?

What are the relations of the forces of the

-United States, ana of their commander, to these districts of
country as they enter them, expelling the forces of the enemy'?
Is he the chief executive of the country of which these districts
are a part, and is he nothing more; and are his powers and
duties those of chief executive only? Has he in this country
subjected to his arms, and while in armed .belligerent occupation
of it, with the forces under his command, has he by law the same
powers and duties as he would have in Massachusetts or New
York in time of profound peace, and has he no others? Has
war given him no powers in law in addition to those possessed by
him in time of peace ? Having in war broken down the hostile
power of it, and driven its forces out of it by the .military force
under his command, has he no new powers there by reason of
that fact? When his subordinate officer, Admiral Farragut,
landed there from the deck of the Hartford, did he carry with
him no right to power not commonly enjoyed by the President in
other territory of the United States ? Did his rights as conqueror cease the moment his power in that character was established? Having entered Louisiana as commander-in-chief, at the
head of his forces victorious, was he at once remitted to the posi-
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tion, powers, and duties of a peace president in times of peace,
and limited to them ? Had he none of the powers or dutiet
of a conqueror in a country subjected to his arms? What was
this country to do for a government when the old hostile one
had been reduced and expelled? Was it to get along without
one as best it could ? Was it to do this until some new one could
spring up to supply the want? Were all the rights of persons
and property, natural and acquired, the right to life, security,
liberty, and property, to be at once suspended, and was the rule
of physical force to override them all ?
The right of a conqueror to govern a country held by him by
right of conquest, is well established on authority. The cases
which establish this right, however, relate to the conquest of a
country foreign to the conqueror, and as to which he has no
rights and is under no restraints, except 'those which come from
the fact of conquest alone, and not to one which is of 'ight a
part of his own proper domain. In this case, the territory over
which the government of the United States had acquired, as we
have' supposed, some rights in the nature of rights of conquest,
belonged of right to it as a pait of its own domaiin, and it
remains to be considered whether that fact makes any difference
in respect to the right by the laws of war to govern a country
conquered.
It may be said that the act of the United States in this case,
had not the usual effect of a conquest of foreign territory; that
instead of acquiring anew the rights of a conqueror, the United
States by this conquest (as I for the sake of convenience have
called it) has but removed the obstacles to the enjoyment of its
pre-existing rights, and has not acquired -any new ones of a conqueror.
As we have seen, the foundation of the right of a conqueror
to govern conquered territory, and for that purpose to establish
provisionally civil institutions in it, is necessity, and that chiefly
the necessity of the conquered country and its inhabitants. A
government of some kind they must have, for no community can
exist without it.
The power of the conqueror has overridden and subjected all
other power, and this necessity can be supplied from no other
source than him, for he holds for the time being all power.
Whilst this continues to be the case, what is there in thbe case in
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question of Louisiana which should make it different from a
foreign country?
The inhabitants of that country owed allegiance to, and were
entitled to the protection of the government of the United -States,
it is said familiarly; and this is quite true in the sense in which
the remark is usually made. But did the United States ever at
any time, or under any circumstances, owe the people of this territory a protection and government which would supply all, or
any considerable part of their wants in this respect?
If the government of the United States should afford to this
country all the protection and aid-should perform for it all the
governmental offices, which it by virtue of the Constitution and
laws of the land was ever bound, or had a right to do, how far
would this go towards supplying the wants of the country in that
respect? Is it not quite certain, on looking into the law on the
subject of the relations, rights, and duties of the Federal government to the tract of country in question, or any other'tract embraced within the state, that with the Federal government in full
function, and all its duties fully performed, a very small portion
of the governmental necessities of the country would be supplied ?
It is a fact familiar to us all, that under our system of government, almost all the governmental aid needed by our people is
due to them from the local depositories of power, the state
governments-for most purposes within their own territory sovereign. These governments, under our system, ire the repositories
of nearly all of the powers of government in ordinary times in
familiar use among us, and whether they be applied by the state
itself, by its own officers directly, or be allotted out in parcels to
smaller governmental districts, such as counties or parishes, cities,
towns, or villages, to be applied by the officers of those localities
respectively, still the state and not the Federal government is
the reservoir from which they are drawn, whether it be for distribution or exercise ; and the state, and not the Federal power and
*officers, administer and execute them.
The man of commerce, the seaman, a traveller on the highway
of nations, the soldier, whether at home or abroad, the direct
instrument of the government, and at once its representative and
defender; and the traveller in a foreign land, experience and real.ze the power and the protecting hand of the Federal government, its value and beneficence; but in the ordinary walks of life,
at home, among plain people, very few-probably not one in a
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hundred-have occasion in a lifetime to invoke or experience any
office or effect, enabling or restraining, protective or punitory, of
that government, whose duty relates in ordinary times and circumstances almost exclusively to the foreign relations of the
country, happily almost always so secure and free from threatening aspect or cause of anxiety as to attract little or no consideration.
From which government comes the system of police by which
order in society is maintained from one end of the land to the
other ? From which the judicial power-the one in question here
and now-by which, in ordinary cases, crime is punished and
repressed, controversies decided, and the rights of persons and
property established and maintained? and what is certainly quite
in point, from which source comes the power by which these very
unfortunate criminals now before me would ordinarily, on a basis
of peace be tried, and justice be meted out to them ? What law
of the United States, as laid down in the Constitution and statutes thereof, did Reiter violate, when (forsaken of his God) he
took the life of his wife, the partner of his bosom, on that hopeful holy morning of the anniversary of the birth of our Saviour,
in the year of that event one thousand eight hundred and sixtytwo? What law of the United States did Louis-poor benighted
Louis-whose eyes have scarcely been blessed with the sight of
himself free to seek his own security or happiness-violate, when
he applied the fatal torch to the fated house, the residence of a
human being?
It is quite certain that the government of the United States,
remitted to its ordinary constitutional functions within one of the
states as in times of peace, could not supply a government at all
adequate to the necessities of society, and especially could not
have taken cognisance of, or punished at all, either of the offences
in question by any tribunal it ever had or had the right to establish.
The necessity for a provisional government here, for nearly all
ithe purposes for which a government is necessary, and especially
lof a provisional tribunal for dispensing justice generally, and in
cases like these now under consideration, was the same as, and
inone other than it would have been if this tract of country in
.question had been a part of the domain of a government wholly
foreign to that of the United States, and over the territory of
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which it had no other rights than those growing out of war and
conquest.
Indeed, it may well be doubted pvhethbr, in reference to
governmental rights and duties in matters vf this kind, there is
any difference between the citizens of the seteral states and those
of foreign territory.
Certain it is from what has been said, that this territory is not,
by'the nature of our system of government, under the dominion
of the Federal government as to most matters of local administration, but is exclusively under the state and local ggvernment,
and the Federal government was never bound'and never assumed
or pretended to furnish government to any section of the states
as to their internal or local matters generally, and has not, and
never had the duty, right, or power to do so.,
But this A~strict of territory had been in insurrection against
the government of the United States lhad openly withdrawn
from all connection with that governmefit under the forms of law
and civil legislation, had allied itself 'with others hostile and at
'war with it, and had, by force of arms, for- a considerable time
maintained this attitude external and hostile, resisting successfully the efforts of the government to subject it to law and duty.
However the act of secession was ineffectual in law, this district had in fact and practically withdrawn from all relations with
th6 government pf the United States, and had arrayed itself in
armed hostility to it. Its duties remained unchanged no doubt,
but its rights to the filial relation-its rights to receive from the
Federal government the consideration and care of a parent rather
than the imperious commands of a military master, may have'
been much changed by the events which had transpired, and I
think that-they had been. Having taken for itself the attitude
of a foreign state, and that too of one hostile and at war with
the United States, and formed and adapted all its civil institutions, and in every respect bent itself to that condition, and claimed
and asserted it, and practically maintained it by force of arms
for a time, and having been at this time overcome and subjected
to the arms of the government of the United States, it may very
well be that while it has acquired no new rights by virtue of its
pretensions, it has resigned and forfeited old ones, and is-no
longer entitled to demand the benefits of a relation it has renounced
and repudiated, however it may have failed in establishing at
that time its freedom from the duties attendant upon it.
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The counsel for the prisoners Reiter and Louis, however, take

different grounds on this motion.
The former insists that the whole structure of the court in its
origin was without warrant in law.
That inasmuch as the Constitution and laws of the-United
States give no authority to the President to establish such a court,
he has none, and that his act in attempting to establish it is ineffectual, from want of constitutional and legal power in him.
While the learned counsel for the accused Louis concede that
the President, as commander of the forces of the United States,
had authority by the laws of war to establish it, and that it had
originally all the powers by him attempted to be conferred, but
insist that these powers have ceased, by reason, as I understand
the argument, of the organization of a civil government here
which supersedes the military. I pass to consider the question
presented by this argument.
If a conqueror in a conquered country have a right to set up
a government in it, when does that right cease ? Or, rather, if
he have such a right, and exercises it, when does the power of
the government so set up cease ?
I answer, first, it will terminate necessarily whenever the
power which formed it shall terminate, or become unable to sup-

port it. And, secondly, whenever that power shall for any cause
voluntarily bring it to an end.
That the power of the Federal government here has not been
terminated, I need no argument to prove. It certainly has not
been expelled, and it quite as certainly has not been withdrawn.
It remains, we all feel and realize, the great, beneficent, paramount, and only power here; able ever to support and supporting itself, and furnishing and supporting every government office
and function here.
But on this point, as well as the one to which I have cited the
cases above referred to, some of those cases speak as authorities.
In two of those cases, at least, in which the power of the provisional government and the provisional courts was sustained by the
Supreme Court of the United States, it was so upheld in territory belonging, aside from military occupation and of rigbt to
the domain of the United States, and over which that government
had powers of government, 'full and complete, for all purposes, as
any sovereign or state has ordinarily within its own territory;
rights not limited to its external matters alone, or chiefly, as are
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those of the United States in territory lying within one of the
states, but embracing powers for all the details of local administration, legislative, executive, and judicial.
And even there, where the United States had by the Constitution, powers of government ample for all purposes, the power to
continue in force a provisional government long after military
occupation had ceased, and when the rights of the United States
there depended not at all on military power or belligerency, but
wholly on compact between the former sovereign and itself-even
there, in territory confessedly belonging to the United States,
and in time of peace, and in the absence of military power or
military necessity, the provisional government and the provisional
courts were upheld to the fullest extent, and were adjudged to
continue legally and practically in force as instruments of the
Federal government until it should, by its constitutional action,
through its legislatuxe, otherwise provide.
In the earlier of those cases, Cross vs. .Harrison, 16 How.
Itep. 164, the court say: " Our conclusion from what has been
said is, that the civil government of California, 6rganized as it
was, from a right of conquest, did not cease or become defunct in
consequence of the signature of the treaty or from its ratification.
We think it was continued over a ceded conquest, without any
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, and
that until Congress legislated for it, the duties upon foreign
goods, &c., were legally demanded and lawfully received by Mr.
Harrison, the collector of the port, who received his appointment,
&c., from Governor Mason."
These cases, in deciding that a provisional government may be
maintained by the military power of the United States in territory belonging to it, not held in military occupation, or jure belli,
go far to prove that the fact that this country belonged, for some
purposes, to the United States, aside from those coming from conquest and military occupation, did not take itfrom the application
of the general principle that the conqueror in conquered territory, has the right to govern it and to establish government as he
may deem expedient; but that such territory, on the contrary, is
on the same footing in that respect as territory strictly and for
all purposes foreign.
There is no pretence that the Federal government has in any
manner directly brought, or sought to bring, the labors of this
court to a close. Having established it, and bade it proceed in
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the performance of its mission, it will continue (the power which
established it continuing) until that power shall revoke, its commission, or otherwise decree its discontinuance..
But it is said that a civil government has been established
here, and that therefore the proper functions of the provisional
one, and. among others, the functions of the provisional court, have
ceased.
It is quite true that some measures apparently tending to the
establishment of a civil government have been taken, lembers
of Congress were elected in 1862, and were admitted to seats in
the National Legislature. Several other officers-a Governor,
Attorney-General, and others, have also been elected more recently under the direction of the military authorities. A convention for the revision of the constitution of the state has been
elected and convened.
These things look like measures for the organization of a state
government, and measures of this kind pursued may in course of
time lead to such a consummation, at the pleasure of the Federal
government.
That all these things have been done under and by virtue of
the fostering care of the Federal government, as exercised by
the military arm of it, no one at all acquainted with the facts
will doubt.
Waiving for the present, however, as unnecessary to be considered here, the question whether these movements have their
foundation in and derive their vital principle from the state or
from Federal sources; and, whether in-use, as some of them are,
they are in fact instruments in the hands of the defunct state, or
of the living Federal power, it is quite certain and sufficient for
present purposes, that the Federal government has not voluntarily abdicated and resigned to them, all or generally, the functions of government, certainly not those of the Provisional Court.
Such a general surrender alone could have divested the power
of this court, for there is no pretence that the Federal government has singled out certain powers, and.among them the powers
heretofore exercised by this court, and so parted with them as
to be unable to recall or exercise them. The whole argument, on
the contrary, proceeds on the idea that civil government, as a
whole, has been established here, and all the power to exercise it
resigned into the hands of state authorities.
In short, that the state is again in possession of all the govern-
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mental powers which of right, under our system, belong to the
state, in contradistinction to the Federal government, and that
the United States retain only what are designed under our system
of government, ordinarily to be exercised by the Federal governnient in all che states in times of peace, and that both parties are,
in fact, remitted to their own positions in the constitutional
government formerly occupied by them, and the same as are now
occupied by the loyal states.
At the time this motion was made (and everything must relate
to that time) there was not a court in the part of Louisiana within the Federal lines having any reasonable pretence of authority
from any other source than the Federal government.
The United States District and Circuit Court, then in operation here, were and are the constitutional courts of that government. All else were creations of the military power of the
Federal government.
The learned argument of Mr. Lamont, the prosecuting attorney
of this court, on that point was entirely correct.
All the governmental functions in exercise here at that time,
not only-courts of justice, but all others, and all the judges, officers, and instruments by which they were performed and operated,
were. those of the Federal government, and were appointed, commissioned, animated, sustained, and moved by that power alone.
The Provisional Court for the state of Louisiana-the court of
the Federal government-retains all the powers it ever had, and
will continue to .exercise rightfully a jurisdiction commensurate
with its charter, so long hs the President, or the government he
represents, shall will it, and shall uphold it for that purpose; and
whatever other institutions may have been brought, or allowed to
come into existence in the, mean time, this court will not cease,
or go out of existence, or be shorn of any of its powers or proportions by reason of the fact that some modicum of them, or of
other powers of civil government, have been allotted by the common parent-the Federal government-to other institutions or
instrumentalities.
Something was said on the argument about the laws which
these courts should administer. The laws of the conquered
country, like everything else connected with its government, are
entirely under the control and subject to the will of the conqueror.
He makes and adopts them in use at his pleasure. Those found
in use at the time of the conquest may be continued in use by
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him or laid aside at his pleasure. If continued in use, however,
they become his, and derive their force and efficacy from him and
his adoption of them. In the cases cited above, a new code was
made and introduced by General Kearney, representing the government of the conqueror, called the Kearney Code.
In the absence of any provision on the subject, in such a case
courts of justice are not bound to adhere to any particular system. This court is commissioned to administer justice, and no
code of laws is prescribed for it. It may adopt such rules as
may seem wise and expedient, whether corresponding to the system in use here at the time of the conquest, or differing from it.
It has always administered justice according to the Code of Louisiana, and so have all other courts here, not because it was bound
by that code, as law of the state, but because it seemed expedient and wise to continue along under the system found in
use here, rather than introduce a new one. That system had
had the sanction of the previous state government, and was no
doubt suited to the occupations, habits, and wants of the people.
The transactions which would become subjects of investigation
had been entered into under and in reference to it as the system
by which they would be construed and enforced. Moreover, it
was already in use, and had better be continued in use and a
change avoided, unless for some decided cause a change was
deemed necessary.
Having adopted that as the rule in the courts here, it became
law to them as well as to society here, and they were bound to
adhere to it and administer justice according to it, so long as it
continued to be the rule. The courts here have always done that,
and it is not probable that the laws of Louisiana have ever been
more closely adhered to in the administration of justice here than
they have been during the time of the government of the. country
by the Federal authorities, since the occupation of it by their
forces.
In the cases cited above from California, Cross vs. Harrison,
16 How. Rep. 164, Leitensdorfer vs. Webb, 20 Id.. 176, and
,7eoker vs. Montgomery, 14 Id. 498, the previously-existing systems of law were ignored and a new and original system introduced, which course received the sanction of the Supreme Court
of the United States in thdse cases; and in the case cited from
Maine, The United States vs. Bice, 4 Wheat. 254, the British
government made a new and different law and administered it
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while the territory was held by it, and that course received the
sanction of the same court of highest authority, in the case referred to.
I have not cited authority for everything I have said in this
opinion-perhaps not for every doctrine I have declared. I have,
however, referred to the court of highest authority in such cases
of any tribunal known among men, and to the decisions of that
court, quite in point, for every principle and doctrine claimed in
this opinion, which is not so plain and evident as to make reference to cases for authority unnecessary and inexpedient, and for
the omission to cite them to such points, I have the very high
authority of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case
of The United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheat. 254, above referred to,
that in cases like that " too clear to require aid from authority,"
it is not well to encumber an opinion with them.
In addition to the cases already commented on, I will refer to
several more having important bearing on this questibn, not as
establishing any new principle or sustaining any old one not better
sustained by more modern and unquestionable authority already
referred to, though equally conclusive of the principle with them;
but as furnishing, perchance, to some mind, some new view,
reason, or illustration of a principle better established on authority by cases already introduced.
Grotius De J. B. ac P. 1. 2, c. , s. 5,et sey.; Id. 1. 3, c. 6,
s.4; Id. 1. 8, c. 9, s. 9, 14;. Puffendorf, by Barbeyrac, 1. 7, c. 7,
s.5; Id. 1. 8, c. 11, s.8; Bynkershoek, Q. J., Pub. I. 1, c. 6,
16; Duponceau's transl., 46, 124; Voet ad Pandect, 1. 39, tit. 4,
no. 7, DeVectigalibu8; Id. 1. 19, tit. 2, no. 28; Id. 1. 49, tit. 15,
no. 1; United States vs. Hayward, 2 Gallis. 501; The Fama,
Rob. 106; The Foltina, Dodson 450; 30 Hogsheads of Sugar,
Bentzen, claimant, 9 Cr. 191; Reeves Law of Ship. 98, et seq.;
United States vs. Vrowell, 5 Cr. 368; United States vs. Arnold,
1 Gallis. 348; s. c., 9 Cr. 106; BEmpson vs. .Bathurst, Winch.
Rep. 20, 50, Winch Entries 384, cited Poph. 176; s. c.,. Hutton
52 ; Com. Dig. Officer, H.
My conclusions, therefore, are: That at the time of 'he establishment of the Provisional Court for Louisiana, a considerable
part of the territory of that state was held by the forces of the
United States, in armed belligerent occupation.
That in a country so held, the authority of the occupying force
is paramount, and necessarily operates the exclusion of all other
independent authority in it.
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.That government from some source is a necessity, and while
the power to give and administer government is exclusively with
a party occupying a country, there can be no doubt that the right
and the duty are his to furnish a government and supply that
want.
That the actual military occupation of that territory by the
United States has continued from that time to the present, and
still continues, and the right and duty of government, therefore,
continue with the United States.
That the establishment of the Provisional Court for Louisiana,
by the President, as commander-in-chief of the forces of the
United States, while they held the territory in which it was to
exercise its functions, was an act warranted by the law of nations.
That so long as the authority of the United States shall continue, the right and the duty of it as the party dominant there
to afford to the country a government will continue.
That said court has, from the time of its foundation to the present time, rightfully exercised its functions in territory in which
the government of the United States has been by force of its
arms sovereign, and will continue rightfully to exercise them
there, so long as its commission shall remain unrevoked, and the
power of the United States shall continue to support it in the
exercise of them.
NoTE.-The counsel of libellants in the case of the Bark Grapeshot, referred
to in the article on the Authority of the Provisional Court, ante p. 388, desire us
to state that that case was transferred by written agreement of parties, and they
believe that no case has occurred of a compulsory transfer of causes from the
United States Courts to the Provisional Court.-ED. Am. LAw REG.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
BARINGER VS. STIVER.

A married woman who has no separate estate cannot, as against her husband's
creditors, acquire a title to property sold as his at sheriff's sale, by repurchase
from the purchaser and giving a mortgage on the property for the whole purchase-money.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
AGNEW, J.-The facts of this case are within a narrow com.
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pass, and present a single question: whether a married woman,
who has no separate estate or known means of payment of her
own, can repurchase from a purchaser at sheriff's sale the property which had been sold as her husband's, who continued in
debt, by giving a mortgage for the whole purchase-money, all of
which remains unpaid.
In Gamber vs. Gamber, 6 Harris 866, it is said that where
.property is claimed by a married woman, she must show by evidence which does not admit of reasonable doubt either that she
.owned it at the time of her marriage or else acquired it by gift,
bequest, or purchase. In the case of purchase after marriage, it is
said, the burden is upon her to prove distinctly that she paid for
it with funds which were not furnished by the husband. That
.case was followed by Raybold vs. Baybold, 8 Harris 311, which
held that property purchased by a wife, paid for in her earnings
and savings, is her husband's. He, it is there said, is still entitled to the person and labor of the wife, and the benefits of her
industry and economy. These positions were emphatically reasserted in Keeney vs. Good, 9 Harris 849. Since those decisions
these principles have been adhered to throughout numerous cases,
in which it has been held that it was not the intent of the legislature, in passing the Married Woman's Act of 1848, to change
the marital relation, or to place the wife upon the footing of a
feme sole. It was intended to preserve to her, and to protect
her bondfide separate estate, but not to make the law a means
of fraud, or the wife a receptacle of her husband's means, into
which they could be clandestinely thrown to the prejudice of his
reditors: Walker vs. .Reamy, 12 Casey 414; Winter J Hartman vs. Walter, 1 Wright 161; Bradford's Appeal, 5 Casey
513; Bear vs. Bear, 9 Id. 525; .Hallowell vs. Horter, 11 Id.
378; _hoads vs. Gordon, 2 Wright 277 ; Aurand vs. Schaffer and
Wife, 7 Id. 363;
ault vs. Saffin and Wife, 8 Id. 307. In the
last case READ, J., gathering up the sum of the former decisions,
said: -It is now settled law that evidence that the wife purchased real or personal estate amounts to nothing unless it be
accompanied by clear and full proof that she paid for it with her
own separate funds-not that she had the means of paying, but
-that she in fact thus paid. This is a definite, precise, and just
rule."
After all these decisions, the rule must be considered settled,
and its application to real as well as personal estate ; and it has
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in fact no exceptions, though there are two or three cases which
are seemingly so. In Wieman vs. Anderson and Wife, 6 Wright
317, the property was indisputably the estate of the wife, and
was merchandise which, from its nature, was a subject of trade,
and the court therefore held that the results of her ownership
also belonged to her, at the same time remarking in reference to
the doctrine of Gamber vs. Gamber, and the cases following in
its train. "We stand by all those cases. We have no reason to
qualify or doubt any of them." Manderbach vs. Mock, 5 Casey
43, in fact, perhaps, ought to have produced a different result in
the verdict under the charge, but when it came into this court
the facts established by the verdict could not be denied. I am
not sure that this case did not overstep the verge somewhat, but
it is sufficient to say that it was distinguished from Gamber vs.
Gamber, the authority of which was distinctly recognised. Conrad
vs. Shomo, 8 Wright 193, was also decided on its special circumstances, which were, that the purchase of the wife was paid for
as far as payments were made with the money of the wife, who
at the.time had ample means distinctly shown from other sources,
while her husband was a man of no property, and the judgment
levied upon the property was obtained after, her rights had fully
vested. The case is expressly distinguished from Gamber vs.
Gamber, by the judge delivering the opinion, though it also lies
on the verge.
The title of Mrs. Baringer, tested by the principles of the
foregoing cases, must fail. It is true, she is a purchaser in the
sense that a deed has been made to her, and that she has given
a mortgage for the purchase-money, which, according to the
doctrine of Patterson vs. Robinson, 1 Casey 81, might be a good
security to the seller to enable him to collect his debt. But
Pattersonvs. Robinson was not a case between the wife and her
husband's creditors. It was merely a charge upon the land for
phrchase-money held good as between her and her grantor to
prevent a grievous wrong being perpetrated under cover of her
disability as a married woman. But a case nearer to the one
before us, if not its exact counterpart, is Robinson & Co. vs.
Wallace, 3 Wright 129. The pure and simple questioi was
there raised, whether a married woman can acquire property by
her credit. The court below doubtingly held she could; and that
it would be protected from her husband's creditors, but in this
VoL.. xIII.-36
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court it was held differently, and that her credit is nothing in the
eyes of the law.
I We adhere to the settled doctrine that it is only when the
property acquired after marriage has been paid for with her own
separate estate, clearly and satisfactorily established, it is hers,
and is protected from her husband's creditors. To suffer a wife
to purchase on credit, is to open a wide door for fraud. Its
effect is to throw upon the creditors the burden of proving whose
funds afterwards enter into the payments. For, starting with
title founded on her credit, she must stand upon it until the
husband's means can be shown to enter into the purchase.
The judgment is affirmed.

supreme Court of Missouri.
THE OHIO AND MISSISSIPPI RAILROAD COMPANY, RESPONDENT, V8.
WILLIAM M. M'PHERSON, APPELLANT.
The directors are the agents of the corporation, and not the corporation itself:
and although they meet without the limits of the state creating the corporation.
yet their proceedings will be valid and binding upon the company. Where the
charter granted by the state of Illinois declared certain persons to be a corporation, and named the directors thereof, such directors could meet and act in the
state of Missouri.
Where the directors named in the act of incorporation met and organized the
company, without the limits of the state granting the charter, one who has subscribed for the stock of the corporation by its corporate name, and paid instalments called for by the directors, is precluded by his own acts from denying the
lawful existence of the corporation.
I Where the corporators met without the limits of the state granting the charter,
and elected a board of directors, and such board made a call for payment upon
the subscription to the stock of the corporation, a subscriber to the stock cannot,
when sued for the call thus made, object to the legality of such election. The
parties thus elected are directors de facto, and the legality of their election
cannot be inquired into collaterally, without showing a judgment of ouster
against them in a direct proceeding for that purpose by the government creating
the corporation.

This suit was commenced the 28th November, 1858, and was
for the recovery of $1400 and interest, being a balance of the
larger sum of $2000, subscribed by the appellant on the 28th of
March, 1851, to the capital stock of the Ohio and Mississippi
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Railroad Company, the respondent. There seems to be no dispute about the facts in the case, but about the law arising upon
them. The facts as disclosed by the record, so far as are material to the questions arising, are as follows :The plaintiff was incorporated by an Act of the Legislature of
the state of Illinois, approved February 12th, 1851; by the first
section of which the persons named therein, "and such other
persons as might associate with them for that purpose, are hereby
made and constituted a body corporate and politic by the name
and style of The Ohio and Mississippi Railroad Company, with
perpetual succession," &c. The purpose of the corporation was
the construction and operation of a railroad commencing- at
Illinoistown, on the east bank of the Mississippi, running thence
to the east line of the said state in the direction of the city of
Vincennes, in the state of Indiana. The act of incorporation
vested the corporate powers of the company in a board of direct-,
ors, to consist of not less than seven nor more than seventeen in
number, and such other officers, agents, and servants as they
should appoint; and named the first board, consisting of thirteen
persons, who, by the provisions of the act, were to hold their,
offices until their successors should be elected and qualified; and
provided that vacaneies in the board might be filled by a vote of
two-thirds of the directors remaining, the appointees to continue.
in office until the next regular annual election of directors, which
was required to be held on the first Monday of September in each
year, at such place as the directors might appoint. A meeting
of the board appointed in the charter was held in the city of St.
Louis, Missouri, on the 28th of March, 1851, at which certain
rules and regulations as to the rights and duties of stockholders
(not necessary to be detailed here) were adopted, and a form of
obligation was prescribed, to be signed by subscribers for stock
in the company. The following is the form of obligation thus
prescribed, and is the same which was subscribed by the defendant, and on.which this suit was brought, viz.:"We, whose names are subscribed hereto, do promise to pay.
to the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad Company, incorporated by
the state of Illinois, the sum of fifty dollars for every share of
stock set opposite to our names respectively, in such manner and
proportions and times as shall be determined by such -company.
in pursuance of the charter thereof, and of the preceding resolutions of the board of directors. Witness the
day of
;.
A. D. 18 ."
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Four calls for payment of subscriptions to stock were ordered
by the board, all at meetings of the board in the city of St.
Louis; the first on the 25th of September, 1851, for two and a
half per cent.; the second on the 19th of November, 1851, for
seven and a half per cent. ; the third on the 5th of August, 1852,
for thirty per cent., and the fourth on the 12th of August, 1853,
for the remainder (sixty per cent.), to be paid in instalments of
five per cent. on and after the 1st of October, 1858, till fully
paid, of which several calls the appellant had due notice. At the
meetings of the board at which the first and third calls were
ordered, there were present six of the thirteen members appointed in the charter, with, in one instance, one, and in another,
two appointees of the charter members; the second call was
ordered by a meeting of seven of the charter members, and two
of their appointees; the fourth call was ordered by a meeting of
directors, elected at a stockholders' election held in the city of
St. Louis on the 6th of September, 1852-none of the directors
in this meeting being charter directors. The appellant paid to
the respondent on his liability arising upon his said subscription,
on the 22d of March, 1852, the sum of $100, and on the 3d of
September, 1853, the further sum" of $500; and in an interview
had between the defendant and the treasurer- of -the company on
the subject of the appellant's said liability, after the year 1855,
and after the completion of the road, he admitted his liability,
and expressed his willingness to pay when called on. A meeting
of the stockholders of the company was held in St. Louis on the
4th of September, 1854, in the proceedings of which the appellant participated, voting with the majority in the adoption of
measures looking to the accomplishment of the objects of the corporation. The avails of stock sold were used in building the road,
and the road was completed on the 30th of June, 1855.
J. R. Shepley, for appellant.-A corporation authorized to be
constituted under an Act of the Legislature cannot accept any
agreement payable to it, or for its benefit, until the prerequisites
have been performed to give it a corporate existence: Wilm.
M. Railroad vs. Wright, 5 Jones Law Rep. 304.
All votes and proceedings of persons professing to act in the
capacity of corporators, when assembled beyond the bounds of
the state granting the charter of incorporation, are wholly void :
Ang. & Ames on Corporations, § 498 ; Runyan vs. Coster'8Lesees,
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14 Pet. 128; Miller vs. .Ewer, 27 Me. 509; Freemanvs. .Maeias
W. & H. Co., 88 Id. 248; Ohio & Mississippi Railroad Co. vs.
Wheeler, 1 Black, U. S. 286; Bank vs. Adams, 1 Pars. Sol.
Cas. 548; Bank of Augusta vs. Earle, 13 Pet. 519.
If a corporation has no legal existence, or if any acts of a
corporation are void, no act of a corporator or stockholder can
give vitality to the one, or legalize and make valid the other.
There have never been any legal and valid calls upon the
defendant for his subscription, or at any rate for that portion
which still remains unpaid, even conceding that the board in the
charter named were in existence; for,
1. All the calls were made at meetings of the board held in
the city of St. Louis.
2. The third call was not made by a majority of the directors
named in the charter. A majority of the board must be present
to do any act: Ang. & Ames on Corp., § 501.
3. The fourth call was made when not a single member of the
board of directors named in the charter was present, and only
six members present. As the defendant has paid thirty per cent.
of his subscription, it is entirely unimportant whether the first
two calls, together only amounting to ten per cent., were legal
or not. That has been paid, and an amount more than the
twenty-five per cent. mentioned in the charter has been paid, so
that, as to the calls, the question is narrowed down to the legality
of the third and fourth calls, and about these it does not seem
that there can be any serious question as to their invalidity.
S. T. Glover, for respond~t.-The statute of Illinois (Sess.
Acts of Ill. p. 89, 1851) created a corporation per se. Section
1 of this statute declares that certain persons , are thereby constituted a body corporate and politic by the name and style of
The Ohio and Mississippi Railroad Company." Section 6 of the
same statute (p. 92) appoints a board of directors, and vests in
them c all the corporate powers of the company." Such a charter gave being to the corporation in perfect form the moment the
persons named proceeded to use the granted franchises.
The directors who were appointed by the charter being legal
directors, and the corporation having attained perfect existence,
and being put fully into operation by their doing the work contemplated by the charter, it is immaterial whether subsequent
directors were regularly and legally chosen or not. Any direct-
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ors coming in by consent or acquiescence, and acting colore officii,
would be de facto directors, and their acts would be valid: 4
Rawle 9; 12 Wheat. 70; Aug. & Ames on Corp., t. p. 104-5, and
the cases there cited.
But there was nothing in the objection that the directors or
corporators held their meetings in Missouri: 6 Conn. 429; 3
Duer 648; 14 Pet. 122. No good reason can be given for prohibiting such action: 18 Pet. 519. 27 Maine 509 is in point
for defendant as to proceedings by a board out of the state being
void. This case was ruled on a mistaken view of 13 Pet. 588.
No reason has ever been advanced why a board cannot sit out of
the state, while every other act can be done there.
The defendant, by contracting with the company, and by participating in the proceedings of the corporation, voting his stock,
&c., is estopped to deny the corporate existence : 5 Ala. N. S.
807-8; 16 Mass. 87; 16 S. & R. 145. "c If defendant accepted
the charter and acted on it, * * * * it does not lie in 'his mouth
to object :" 2 Mo. 137.
Irregularities and defects in organization, whether material or
immaterial, cannot be drawn into view by a debtor as a defence
to calls: 16 B. Mon. 7, 471; Redf. on Railroads 85; Id. 9; 1
Sandford 168; Ang. & Ames 85, 636; 16 Ala. 374; 16 S. & R.
145; 9 Wend. 351; 4 Denio 892; 27 Penn. 387; Grant on
'Corp. 92.
V. Homes, on the same side.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DRYDEN, J., who, after stating the facts already set forth,
proceeded :-A recovery in this case was resisted on two grounds:
first, that the facts were insufficient to show an acceptance of the
charter, and therefore the plaintiff was not shown to have any
corporate existence; secondly and mainly, that the votes and
proceedings of the stockholders and directors when assembled in
St. Louis, beyond the bounds of the state granting the respondent's charter, were wholly 'void, and therefore that the calls
which were ordered in St. Louis, and in one instance by a board
elected in St. Louis, were invalid, and imposed no obligation on
the appellant to respect them.
1. As to the corporate existence of the respondent. It is
maintained by the counsel for the appellant, that no acts of the
board of directors performed beyond the territorial limits of the
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state from which the charter emanated could be a valid accept.
ance of the charter. In support of this position reliance is had
chiefly on Hiller vs. Ewer, 27 Me. 509. That was a writ of entry
for a tract of land in which the demandants derived their title
from the Bluehill Granite Company, incorporated by an Act of
the Maine Legislature. On the trial it appeared that the meeting of the corporators was called for the organization of the
corporation under its charter in the city of New York, and that
the charter was there accepted, and the officers of the corporation
(president, directors, and secretary) were chosen. At a meeting
of the directors thus elected, held in the city of New York, a
resolution was adopted directing the president and secretary to
execute the conveyahice under which the demandants claimed
title. There was no proof that any meeting for the organization
of the company, or for the choice of its officers, had ever been
holden in the state of Maine ; but there was proof that the company, by a person acting as its agent, transacted business in the
state. The question involved in the case involved the validity or
invalidity of the conveyance thus made by the president and
secretary in behalf of the company. The court decided it wa
void, but placed its decision not on the ground that the board of
directors ordering the execution of the conveyance met at a
wrong place,'but alone on the ground that the election of the
directors by the stockholders having been held outside of the
state, and because held out of the state was void, and gave the
directors thus chosen no legal authority to convey or to direct
the conveyance of the corporate property. The opinion in the
case, while it denies extraterritorial power to corporators, concedes it to directors. The court says: ,The directors of a corporation are not a corporate body; they are, when acting as a board,
but a board of officers or agents, and they may exercise their
powers as agents beyond the bounds where the corporation exists."
In the present case the charter created a corporation in presenti,
and appointed a board of directors without the necessity of any
action on the part of the corporators; and if any assent was
necessary to infuse life into this body politic, the proceedings of
these directors, although had beyond the bounds and limits of the
state of Illinois, were, according to the authority quoted, a sufficient expression of that assent.
But aside from the question whether the action of the board
of directors beyond the bounds of the state was a sufficient ex-
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pression of assent to give vitality to the corporation, the appellant's position towards the respondent is such as ought to preclude
him from denying its corporate existence. The case of The
Dutchess Cotton Manufacturing Company vs. Davis, 14 Johns.
238, was a suit on a promise to pay the price of stock subscribed
by the defendant. The court, on the authority of .Henriquesvs.
The Dutch West India Conpany, 2 Lord Raymond 1535, held
that the defendant having entered into a contract with the plaintiffs in their corporate name, thereby admitted them to be duly
constituted a body politic and corporate.
The appellant having contracted with the respondent in its
corporate name, paid his money to it as an existing living thing
in answer to its corporate demands, and from year to year having
attended meetings of its stockholders, and voted at elections and
upon questions which clearly implied the respondent's existence,
he ought to be estopped from denying what he has thus often and
so solemnly admitted : All Saints Church vs. Davis, 1 Hall, N. Y.
191; Johin et al. vs. Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank of Indiana, 2
Blackf. 367; Chester Glass Co. vs. Dewey, 16 Aass. 94.
2. As to the invalidity of the calls. In the examination of the
case under the first objection urged to the respondent's right to
recover, I think I have shown that the first three calls, as they
were ordered by the directors, the validity of whose appointment
was not controverted, were subject to no valid objection, although
ordered by the board when in session beyond the territorial limits
of Illinois. But the alleged invalidity of the fourth call rests
upon a total denial of official authority in those who ordered it.
This call, as has been seen, was ordered by a board chosen by
the stockholders of the company at an election in the city of St.
Louis; and it is insisted, on the authority of the case of Miller
vs.- Ewer,-already cited, that this election, by reason of the place
where it was held, was a nullity, conferring no authority whatI am not disposed to question the
ever on the persons chosen.
soundness of that decision in its application to the facts of that
case, but I am unwilling to extend the principle there laid down
to a case materially differing in its circumstances, as I think the
In that case at the time the
one under consideration does.
obnoxious election was held the corporation had no existence-it
had not yet come into being; and, there being neither corporators nor corporation, no valid official authority could be coinmunicated by such election ; but in this case, at the time the
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election occurred to which objection is made, the corporation was,
and for more than a year had been, in full life, exercising all the
functions and franchises contemplated by its charter. After the
corporation had become full fledged, I see nothing in reason or
in principle why the stockholders might not as well elect directors as the directors a treasurer on the Missouri side of the line.
The utmost that could be said under such circumstances is, that
the election was irregular.
The corporation having been once put into existence, if the
members of the board of directors-whether charter members or
their appointees, or those elected by the stockholders in St.
Louis-accepted their offices and acted under their appointment
or election, as the evidence shows was the case, they became
directors de facto, and their authority to act in behalf of the
corporation could not be questioned by the appellant in this, a
collateral suit, without showing a judgment of ouster against
them in a direct proceeding by the Government for that purpose:
Trust. of Vernon Society vs. Hills, 6 Cow. 23; All Saints
Church vs. Lovett, 1 Hall, N. Y. 198-9;' John et al. vs. Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank of Indiana, 2 Blackf. 367; Ang. &
Ames on Corp., 3d ed. 104-5.
I find no error in the record. Let the judgment be
affirmed.
BAY, J., concurred.
BATES, J., dissenting.- I hold that this election of directors
by the corporators in the city of St. Louis (outside of the state
of Illinois) was an absolute nullity: Aug. & Ames on Corp.
§ 498. The defendant's contract with the plaintiff was that he
would pay -in such manner and proportions and times ks shall
be determined by said company, in pursuance of the charter
thereof, and of the preceding resolutions of the board of directors."
The charter vested the corporate powers of the company in the,
board of directors. The resolution of the board of directors
which preceded the subscription of stock, provided that the calls
for payments on the subscriptions should be made by the board.
The persons who made the last call were not directors, the
pretended election of them being an absolute nullity. There is
nothing in the whole case which tends to show that the defendant
in any manner, at any time or place, ever recognised them as

